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Abstract 
Taxation became a source of revenue in most of the developed and developing countries. However, tax non-compliance remains 
as a serious issue around the globe. The negative impact of tax non-compliance on economy and evolving nature of indirect tax in 
Malaysia have induced this study. The smuggling activities involved cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles have caused a great 
loss to the tax revenue in Malaysia. Hence, this study attempts to propose conceptual framework by integrating tax agents as 
moderating effects between tax rate, penalty rate, tax fairness and peer influence with non-compliance on excise duty. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxation is always classified as a fundamental and crucial tool in managing national revenue especially in most of 
the developed and developing countries (Tabandeh, Jusoh, Nor, & Zaidi, 2013). Hence, tax is the most important 
means in financing government expenditures. In the economic perspective, tax is considered as an income re-
distribution mechanism from the rich to the poor apart from generating revenue for the public finance (Saez, 2004). 
Furthermore, taxes are also introduced to improve the health and safeguard the environment. For example, by 
introducing certain taxes called sin tax to cigarettes, it is expected that their usage will be reduced to encourage a 
healthier way of life and protect damage caused by cigarette smoke (Miskam, Noor, Omar, & Aziz, 2013). 
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However, people are reluctant to pay taxes and thus cause problems for tax authority to collect and impose taxes 
anywhere and timely (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, & Schneider, 2004). Taxpayers’ failure to comply with the tax laws 
involves committing a non-compliance act (Kirchler, Muehlbacher, Kastlunger, & Wahl, 2007). In line with this, 
Franzoni (2008) mentioned non-compliance is a tax administrative most common and critical problem.  
Tax non-compliance is a severe issue that exists globally including Malaysia (Hai & See, 2011a). Non-compliance 
signifies failing to meet tax declaration requirements or failure to engage tax responsibilities intentionally or 
unintentionally (Kinsey, 1988). Despite the escalating tax non-compliance problem in Malaysia, only a few studies 
have been conducted to examine the determinants of this phenomenon (Abdul-Jabbar, 2009). These studies mainly 
focused on income and corporate taxes behavior, excluding the studies by Tayib (1998) and Nor Aziah (2004) 
regarding the local government taxes. However, smuggling offences and customs tariff are not always highlighted by 
tax authority and researchers (Delipalla, 2009). Giles, Tedds, and Werkneh (2002) defined smuggling activities as all 
transactions whether legal or illegal, market or non-market done to evade taxes from the tax authority. The indirect 
taxes evasion often related to smuggling offences especially on customs tariffs. The smuggling offences affects 
monetary as well as non-monetary revenue such as embargo, product quality and quotas (Ayitey Stephens, Boddewyn, 
& Ross Sproul, 1991). Furthermore, only a few academic scholars have done research on non-compliance because of 
the difficulties faced, especially on measurement involving companies, individuals whether they are involved 
unintentionally or intentionally in tax payments (Hai & See, 2011b). Therefore, this study focuses on the phenomenon 
and the determinants of excise duty non-compliance among importers as taxpayers. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Tax Non-compliance 
Tax authorities play fundamental roles in ensuring tax compliance among taxpayers by abiding tax rules and 
regulations. Despite the arrangements, the confrontation in human society still exist which causes the numerous cases 
of tax non-compliance. James and Alley (2002) described tax non-compliance as a failure of taxpayer to accommodate 
tax responsibilities whether they performed unintentionally or intentionally. Tax non-compliance treated as a contrary 
conduct or attitude of tax compliance. Tax non-compliance examples are tax evasion and tax avoidance which carries 
negative impacts on tax compliance and tax collections. Kasipillai, Aripin, and Amran (2003) anticipated tax evasion 
as a conduct caused to reduce the taxes owed in reality. Whereas, tax avoidance is described as taxpayers declaring 
their tax affairs creatively according to the rules and regulations to lower the tax liabilities and this action is legal in 
tax administrator’s point of view. 
In Customs context smuggling activities is one of the important determinant causing non-compliant. Smuggling 
activities consists of three types which are incorrectly declaring the amount, for instance declaring less quantity and 
price, incorrectly declaring the descriptions of goods and state at lesser than legally practiced (Cooper & Bhagwati, 
1974). The popular smuggling methods and Customs frauds involves fake invoicing, complicated transactions 
attempts, using two invoices, the false invoices are used for declaration and the genuine invoices are used for record 
purposes, tariff code miss-classification, over stated and under stated valuation and shipments (Thanasegaran & 
Shanmugam, 2007). In Malaysia’s context indirect taxes are avoided through falsifying the declaration, smuggling or 
Customs fraud (Miskam et al., 2013). 
2.2 Excise Duties 
Excise duty is one of the components in indirect taxes. The excise duty imposed to import into Malaysia and locally 
manufactured goods as stated in Section 6 of Excise Act 1976. This duty is used as a mechanism to alter the trend of 
public consumptions or social engineering (Delipalla, 2009). The commodities bound in Excise duty act includes 
liquor, tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, four wheel drive, multi-purpose vehicles and playing cards. 
2.1 Tax rate 
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According to Fischer’s model, tax rate is one of the factor influencing the tax non-compliance behavior. Prior 
studies investigated tax rate and tax compliance produced mixed results. For instance, if the marginal tax rate is 
increased the taxpayers’ are likely to understate their tax returns (Skinner & Slemrod, 1985). This is what they referred 
to as higher tax rates caused the higher pressure of taxpayers’ which motivates to non-compliance behaviour (Atawodi 
& Ojeka, 2012). Additionally, Mohd Yusof, Ming Ling, and Bee Wah (2014) reviewed tax non-compliance among 
small-and-medium sized corporations in Malaysia and identified that significant effect exist between marginal tax rate 
on corporate tax non-compliance. Under the Economic Deterrence theory, the increases in tax rate will decreases the 
compliance level (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). According to Richardson (2006) through cross-national study 
identified tax rates have significant and negative relationship with tax compliance which implies higher tax rates will 
lower the taxpayers’ compliance level. However, study done by Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey (1994) shows the 
positive relationship between marginal tax rate and tax evasion, increasing in marginal tax will increase tax evasion. 
Therefore, the proposed hypothesis for the current study is:  
 H1a: There is a relationship between tax rate with non-compliance of excise duty by importers. 
It is equally important to be aware that the consultations given by the tax agents may also have moderating effect 
on the impact of the tax rate on non-compliance. According to Doyle, Hughes, and Glaister (2009) tax agents have 
significant influence in deciding the amount of the tax declared and paid by their clients. Hence, tax agent has strong 
effect on the tax rate and excise duty non-compliance (Sekaran, 2006). Therefore, the moderating effect hypothesis to 
tax agents between tax rate and non-compliance of current study is: 
 H1b: Tax agents will moderate the relationship between the tax rate with non-compliance of excise duty by 
importers.  
 
2.2 Penalty rate 
The taxpayers’ detained under the audit and investigations process will be penalised by the tax authority. Penalty 
is correlated with punishment or sanctions. There are mixed findings on the impacts of penalties and tax non-
compliance. A majority of the tax compliance prior academic scholars showed a significant association between 
penalties and tax compliance behavior (Maciejovsky, Schwarzenberger, & Kirchler, 2012). According to Devos 
(2013) there is a positive association of penalties and tax compliance. A study done by Slemrod (2004) indicates the 
penalty severity might deter the taxpayers from reporting accurate tax returns based on the tendency of profit is greater 
than the tendency for losing. This shows the negative relationship between the penalty rate and tax compliance. 
Therefore, the propose hypothesis is: 
 H2a: There is a relationship between penalty rate with non-compliance of excise duty by importers. 
The tax declaration service provided by tax preparers, shows a conflict with the services that taxpayers’ seek. Tax 
agents represent customers with hostile tax situation. While, taxpayers’ hire tax agents to increase accuracy and avoid 
any penalties enforced by tax authorities (Stephenson, 2007). Therefore, the current study’s hypothesis moderating 
effect in influencing penalty rate is: 
H2b: Tax agents will moderate the relationship between the penalty rate with non-compliance of excise duty by 
importers.  
2.3 Tax Fairness 
Tax fairness has an important role in determining tax compliance behaviour. Most of the prior studies on tax 
compliance indicate mixed results pertaining tax non-compliance and tax fairness. The taxpayers attitude and 
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perceptions on tax system’s fairness is identified as a fundamental determinant that have significant impacts on the 
tax compliance behaviour (Alabede, 2012). If the taxpayers perceived the tax system is unfair to them, it will motivate 
to non-compliance behaviour (Gilligan & Richardson, 2005). Moreover, Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) stated if 
taxpayers believed tax system is unfair, they are more prone not to comply to the tax rules and regulations. According 
to Porcano (1984) the fairness of tax system is determined by the ability to pay and fulfilled the needs of taxpayers. 
Additionally, Richardson (2006) found significant negative correlation between tax evasion and tax system fairness. 
However, (Murphy, 2004) identified  procedural fairness and tax compliance have direct and positive effect. Similarly, 
Verboon and van Dijke (2011) indicates procedural fairness and deterrence variables positively related with tax 
compliance. From the above elaboration, the related hypotheses to be tested in this study is as stated below. 
H3a: There is a relationship between tax fairness with non-compliance of excise duty by importers. 
Tax agents playing dual roles as an advocates to the taxpayers’ deal as an intermediaries in the tax system. Tax 
agents’ position is challenging to maintain the boundaries as an advocates and professionals (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003). 
If the taxpayers’ perceived the tax system is unfair to them will prefer for aggressive tax reporting may lead to non-
compliance (Hite & McGill, 1992). Tax agents as a moderating effect might enhance or reduce the relationship 
between independent variables or dependent variable (Lindley & Walker, 1993). Therefore the below hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 H3b: Tax agents will moderate the relationship between the tax fairness with non-compliance of excise duty by 
importers. 
2.4 Peer Influence 
Peer influence comprises of ‘members of the family’, ‘current or future employer’, ‘close friends’, and ‘spouse / 
significant others’(Hanno & Violette, 1996). Prior studies on tax compliance showed mixed results in peer influence 
towards tax compliance. Peer influence is the perception on others action in a particular situation will lead to the 
determinant of approval or disapproval behaviour of an individual (O'Shaughnessy, 2014). Peer influence and tax 
compliance shows mixed results based on the previous studies findings. In the prior tax compliance literatures, it has 
been identified taxpayers are more likely to evade taxes if believed their peers are doing so (Grasmick & Scott, 1982; 
Spicer & Becker, 1980). This phenomenon is elaborated in Theory of Reasoned Action known as social psychology 
theory, explained individual’s intention formed by attitude and subjective norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Attitude 
perceived as a positive or negative will influence behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Whereas, subjective norms 
referring to individuals believes on referent groups that caused to perform a specific behaviour (Bobek, Roberts, & 
Sweeney, 2007). For instance, if tax evasion is tolerable among the group norms and expectations it will induced the 
individual to perform the same behaviour (Chan, Troutman, & O’Bryan, 2000). According to Mason and Calvin 
(1978), the knowledge received from peers on taxes and politics will increases tax evasion. Whereas, Alon and 
Hageman (2013) found negative relationship between particularized trust. Similarly, Torgler (2012) found significant 
and negative relationship and indicates dissatisfied individuals are more prone discussed political issues with peers. 
Therefore, the hypothesis stated will be as below: 
H4a: There is a relationship between peer influence with non-compliance of excise duty by importers. 
 
Tan (2011) also mentioned the advice given by tax agents to the clients depend on the clients risk profile shows 
the impacts of clients in determining ethical decision making by tax agents. Hite and McGill (1992) indicates the tax 
agents’ aggressiveness as a moderator in preparing tax returns influenced by the opinion given by their peers. From 
the above elaboration, the related hypothesis to be tested in this study is as stated below. 
 
H4b: Tax agents will moderate the relationship between peer influence with non-compliance of excise duty by 
importers.  
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2.5 Tax agent 
Tax agents playing a vital role in determining the compliance level of importers as a taxpayer’. Their significant 
role as a tax preparers have tendency in affecting the direction of the relationship between independent variables and 
dependent variable. Therefore tax agents have strong effect on independent and dependent variables and modify the 
original relationship between them. Edwards and Lambert (2007) mentioned the moderator is introduced when have 
the influence in strengthening the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable and its effect 
on behaviour. In the previous research done by academic scholars indicates there are mixed results on compliance 
behaviour of tax agents and taxpayers. The tax professionals’ impacts in determining Australian individual taxpayers’ 
studied by Devos (2012), the results revealed there was statistically significant association between the advices 
furnished by tax professionals and Australian individual taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. While, Blaufus, Hechtner, 
and Möhlmann (2014) investigated the association between the expenses incurred for tax preparation by tax 
professionals’ and tax compliance. The negative relationship between expenses exceeded the estimated tax savings 
caused for the non-compliance. Whereas in Malaysia the research done by Choong, Tong, and Tan (2008) shows 
significant relationship between age, gender and education level with the nature of ideal tax practitioners preferred. 
3. Research conceptual framework 
This study is underpinned by the Deterrence theory associated with the Fischer’s Model by considering economic, 
social and psychological factors in determining noncompliance behaviour among importers as taxpayers for cigarettes, 
liquor and vehicles. Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, and Schabmann (2013) pointed out not only the economic model 
will influence the compliance behaviour but have to consider social and psychological factors as well. Based on the 
prior studies results the conceptual framework for the current study as illustrated in figure 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
Tax System Structure 
x Tax Rate 
x Penalty Rate 
Attitude and Perceptions 
x Tax Fairness 
x Peer Influence 
Non-compliance on 
Excise Duty  
 Tax Agents 
Figure 1.1 Research Proposed Model  
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4.   Conclusion 
The current study emphasized on indirect tax non-compliance on excise duties particularly on indirect tax involves 
cigarettes, liquor and imported vehicles. Furthermore, this study developed a conceptual model by enhancing and 
integrating Fischer’s Model in determining non-compliance on excise duty. The factors that influenced the tax non-
compliance on excise duty based on the tax compliance and tax non-compliance literatures. The determinants of excise 
duty non-compliance in current study comprising tax rate, penalty rate, tax fairness, peer influence and tax agents as 
a moderating effect. 
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